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By Kevin Outterson and Anthony McDonnell
Funding Antibiotic Innovation
With Vouchers: Recommendations
On How To Strengthen A Flawed
Incentive Policy
ABSTRACT A serious need to spur antibiotic innovation has arisen because
of the lack of antibiotics to combat certain conditions and the overuse of
other antibiotics leading to greater antibiotic resistance. In response to
this need, proposals have been made to Congress to fund antibiotic
research through a voucher program for new antibiotics, which would
delay generic entry for any drug, even potential blockbuster lifesaving
generics. We find this proposal to be inefficient, in part because of the
mismatch between the private value of the voucher and the public value
of the antibiotic innovation. However, vouchers have the political
advantage in the United States of being able to raise sufficient amounts
of money without annual appropriations from Congress. We propose that
if antibiotic vouchers are to be considered, the design should include
dollar and time caps to limit their volatility, sufficient advance notice to
protect generic manufacturers, and market-based linkages between the
value of the voucher and the value of the antibiotic innovation. We also
explore a second option: The federal government could auction vouchers
to the highest bidders and use the money to create an antibiotics
innovation fund.
B
acteria constantly evolve, especial-
ly in response to antibiotics used in
agriculture and medicine. Resis-
tant bacteria already kill 23,000
people a year in the United States1
and more than 700,000 people worldwide, in-
cluding 214,000 neonatal deaths each year from
sepsis.2 Absent dramatic changes, ten million
people could die annually by 2050 from resistant
bacteria, viruses, retroviruses, and parasites.3
Much of this resistance is driven by wasteful
overuse of antibiotics in inappropriate settings.4
In addition to this crisis of overuse, antibiotics
are tragically underused in many parts of the
world. Broader access to existing antibiotics
could save 445,000 children younger than age
five from death as a result of community-
acquired pneumonia.2,4
Many global stakeholders are mobilizing to
respond to these threats, including the World
Health Organization,5 the European Union,6
the United States,7 the Review on Antimicrobial
Resistance,3 the Group of Seven (G7) member
countries,8 and think tanks such as Chatham
House in London.9,10 These stakeholders have
made proposals that collectively call for a
three-prong approach to resistant bacteria:
access, to maximize the health impact of anti-
biotics, especially in low-income populations
currently suffering from inadequate access; con-
servation, which decreases the need for antibiot-
ics through infection control, vaccination, and
antibiotic stewardship; and innovation, policies
supporting the development of powerful new
generations of antibiotics.11 While these ap-
proaches are valuable and necessary, one com-
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monweakness they share is inadequate funding.
For example, in keeping with the recommenda-
tions of the US National Strategy on Combating
Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, President Barack
Obama’s 2016 budget called for an additional
$1.2 billion, but as of mid-April 2016, Congress
had not yet acted.12 Political realities in the Unit-
ed States and across the world could dampen a
sufficient response.
In this environment, some US stakeholders
have recently proposed “antibiotic vouchers”
that could fund antibiotic innovation.13–15 These
wouldwork as follows: A companydeveloping an
innovative antibiotic could obtain from the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) a voucher that
could be sold (transferred) to another pharma-
ceutical firm for the purpose of extending that
firm’s patent exclusivity on an existing drug.
Most of the discussions about antibiotic vouch-
ers have occurred in the US context, where this
idea enjoys the powerful lure of not requiring
annual appropriations from Congress. Through
what some might call a budget gimmick, anti-
biotic vouchers can achieve a zero budget impact
score from the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), so long as higher drug prices from the
delayed entry of generic drugs do not occur dur-
ing the ten-year CBO scoring window for assess-
ing federal budget impact. The costs are shifted
to government programs such as Medicare and
Medicaid, private healthplans, andother payers’
health budgets in future decades.
In our view, these proposals are unwise for the
efficiency and fairness reasons previously de-
scribed in the literature16–18 and updated in this
article.We also raise additional criticisms, but in
an effort to be constructive, especially in light of
urgent funding needs, we suggest key modifica-
tions that ameliorate some of the worst features
of antibiotic vouchers, resulting in the “least
bad” version of the proposal.
Antibiotic Vouchers
As the voucher scheme is currently envisioned,
high-quality antibiotic innovation will be re-
warded with a transferable voucher, similar in
some respects to the existing Tropical Diseases
Priority Review Voucher Program,19 but with a
key difference. The priority review vouchers
speed up FDA review times by allowing a stan-
dard drug to be given priority review status, sav-
ing about fourmonths.20 Antibiotic vouchers are
transferable like the priority review vouchers;
however, unlike the priority review vouchers,
they extend the market exclusivity period for
any other drug or biologic product by a year even
if it is not an antibiotic. While priority review
vouchers speed the market entry of a non–prior-
ity reviewdrug, antibiotic vouchersdelaygeneric
entry of a competing drug against whichever
drug the voucher holder desires to protect. For
example, the holder of an antibiotic voucher
could apply it to an oncology drug, delaying ge-
neric entry by an additional year. To allow man-
ufacturers of generic drugs to plan, vouchers
should not be used during the final four years
of a drug’s patent protection before generic en-
try. Companies that receive the voucher would
alsomake binding commitments regarding anti-
biotic stewardship, which avoids wasteful mis-
use and unnecessary resistance. Some proposals
for these vouchers also call for donations to pub-
lic entities such as the National Institutes of
Health or an antibiotic innovation fund.13
Earlier versions of this idea were called “wild-
card” patents.15–18 At present, the mechanism is
not patent law but a regulatory provision that
delays generic entry of drugs. The concept is
known as regulatory exclusivity. Current exam-
ples of nontransferable regulatory exclusivities
include the seven years granted in the United
States to orphan drugs, the twelve years for bio-
logics, and the six months granted to a drug
sponsor after conducting pediatric studies.21,22
Efficiency As a fundingmechanism, antibiot-
ic vouchers are not particularly efficient. In this
context, “less efficient” means higher future
drug prices, with less antibiotic innovation to
show for it. This is the case for several reasons.
▸ LENGTH OF EXCLUSIVITY PERIOD: First, the
efficiency of antibiotic vouchers depends greatly
on the length of the exclusivity period (Exhib-
it 1).Methods for calculating efficiency are avail-
able in the online Appendix.23 For example, if
vouchers are granted only for very high-quality
drugs,24 then a reasonable target is nomore than
fifteen drugs per decade.3 From recent reviews of
antibiotic research and development costs, each
of these drugs will have required perhaps
$800 million in expenditures to bring it to mar-
ket,3,15,24–26 with aggregate costs in the range of
$12 billion per decade for fifteen drugs. With
these costs in mind, how long should the exclu-
sivity period be for each voucher? If based solely
on time (for example, twelve months), then a
voucher—which delays generic entry—that is ap-
plied to a drugwithUS sales exceeding $6 billion
will protect those sales dollars fromgeneric com-
petition after the patent expires. Consumers and
healthplans (includingMedicare,Medicaid, and
private plans) will pay more, since the voucher
will delay the significant reductions in price as-
sociated with generic entries, in the range of
80 percent or more.27,28 Therefore, the approxi-
mate nominal cost to the US health system of a
single twelve-month voucher in this example ex-
ceeds $4.8 billion (80percent of $6 billion), with
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aggregate costs of $72 billion per decade for fif-
teen drugs. At a global level, a previous estimate
using 2005 sales data found that a single one-
year global voucher would cost health systems
and consumers up to $9.4 billion.16
This is an extraordinarily inefficient financing
mechanism even if only limited to the United
States, spending $4.8 billion in higher future
drug costs in exchange for each incremental
$800 million in antibiotic research and develop-
ment. If this was structured as a loan from the
company to the government, the implicit inter-
est rate would range from 29 percent to 43 per-
cent per year. Shortening the exclusivity period
to three months would be much more efficient;
priced as a loan, the implicit interest rate falls to
6.0–8.5 percent.
▸ LINK BETWEEN VALUE AND REWARD: Sec-
ond, the value of the reward should be propor-
tional to the effort undertaken, but the link be-
tween value and reward is particularly tenuous
for antibiotic vouchers. Voucher values change
over time, introducing risk for the companies
and insurers. Value will vary based on the drugs
sold by the company holding the voucher. It
would be most valuable in the hands of the com-
pany with the biggest-selling drug nearing the
end of its patent exclusivity and therefore near-
ing the time of generic entry. It would be less
valuable for the company with the second-big-
gest-selling drug facing competition from gener-
ic entry.But valuesmight also increaseunexpect-
edly, perhaps in response to commercial
opportunities or successful patent litigation
against a branded drug that suddenly upset com-
mercial expectations. So rewardswill vary signif-
icantly over time, as we have seen with the value
of priority review vouchers, which are awarded
by the FDA but can be sold by the voucher holder
to the highest bidder. Priority review vouchers
have sold for increasing amounts. The first
voucher sold for $67.5 million, but subsequent
sales prices rose to $125 million, $245 million,
and most recently $350 million.19 These signifi-
cant increases in value should not be viewed as
evidence of success in incentivizing research and
development, since the rewards are not propor-
tional to the research and development costs or
the value of the underlying innovation. Vouchers
also entail significant transaction costs when
sold, including paying the lawyers, brokers,
and consultants who facilitate a voucher sale.
▸ REWARDING HIGH-QUALITY INNOVATIONS:
Third, any system will have to be designed to
limit rewards only to appropriate high-quality
innovations. The first priority review voucher
was granted in 2009 to Novartis for a combina-
tion drug containing artemether and lumefan-
trine for treatment of malaria, despite already
being on the market in many countries outside
of theUnited States.19 This development has con-
tinued. Knight Therapeutics gained a tropical
disease priority review voucher in 2014 for mil-
tefosine,19 despite the fact that it was already on
themarket and being used to treat leishmaniasis
inmany countries. By registering it in theUnited
States, Knight Therapeutics became eligible for
the voucher, which it then sold to Gilead Scienc-
es for $125million, even though the voucher was
not based on any new drug innovation.19 More
disturbingly, vouchers are awarded even if the
product is not actually registered for sale in low-
income countries or is priced too high for global
health needs. Any system needs to be robust
enough to ensure that drug companies are given
incentives to undertake more research and that
their research leads to greater innovation that
actually improves health, instead of receiving a
windfall for something they would have done
anyway. The recent history of the Generating
Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) Act of 2012,
which extended by five years the exclusivity pe-
Exhibit 1
Cost estimates to US health system budgets for transferable antibiotic exclusivity vouchers
Imputed interest rate
Exclusivity period
Research and
development
supporteda
Direct costs to
US health
budgets Efficiency 5 years 7 years
Twelve months
Per antibiotic voucher $800 million $4.8 billion 16.7% 43.1% 29.2%
Per decadeb $12 billion $72.0 billion
Three months
Per antibiotic voucher $800 million $1.2 billion 66.7% 8.4% 5.9%
Per decadeb $12 billion $72.0 billion
SOURCE Authors’ estimates. NOTES Efficiency is the nominal ratio of research and development supported over direct costs to health
budgets. See the online Appendix for details on the calculation of imputed interest rates (see Note 23 in text). aSee Notes 3, 24–26 in
text. bSee Note 3 in text.
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riod during which antibiotics that treat serious
or life-threatening infections could be sold with-
out generic competition, also raises similar con-
cerns, as the standard for “qualifying infectious
disease product”was set so low that almost every
antibiotic qualifies.29 Any new proposal for anti-
biotic vouchers or other significant incentives
for innovation should set very high standards.24
▸ PRESERVING VOUCHERS FOR APPROPRIATE
CASES: Finally, while supporters may seek to use
antibiotic vouchers as a special case, other
groups and interests will rally to join the queue.
In the short history of the Tropical Disease Pri-
ority Review Voucher Program, Congress has
twice expanded access to the process, first for
rare pediatric diseases in 201230 and then, two
years later, for Ebola and related tropical dis-
eases.31 A current bill proposes exclusivity vouch-
ers forneonatal innovation.14Given the immense
market value of delaying generic entry by one
year for a best-selling drug, other disease groups
can be expected to lobby Congress to grant simi-
lar vouchers for innovation suiting their needs
and interests. As more join, inefficiencies
mount, and the reward value diminishes. For
this system to work, proponents will need to
successfully demonstrate that antibiotics are
an exceptional—even unique—case that war-
rants particular treatment by government.
Fairness While not technically a patent, anti-
biotic vouchers would delay generic entry for
best-selling drugs after the patent has expired.
Consumers and health insurance payers will pay
higher prices in a system with antibiotic vouch-
ers as a result of this delay; this is not a bug, but
an unavoidable design feature of the program.
Antibiotic innovation will be funded through
higher drug prices on other drugs in the future.
One can think of it as a tax on cancer or cardio-
vascular treatment to fund antibiotic innova-
tion.16 If antibiotics are considered essential in-
frastructure for the health system, then perhaps
this is appropriate, but it also raises important
questions about fairness (and, in economic
terms, deadweight loss), including ensuring ap-
propriate access to all drugs both in the United
States and abroad, where access to many thera-
pies is already too limited.2,4,11,32 Delaying generic
entry of a best-selling drug will have real impli-
cations for patients and health systems. If these
rules are also imposed on other countries
through trade agreements, then these risks of
delayed access to needed therapies multiply in
lower-income populations. Any solution to anti-
biotic innovation should be designed to mini-
mize potential global challenges to accessing
these drugs.33
Additional Concerns Antibiotic vouchers
sever the most important linkage in innovation
policy. Throughout the history of US intellectual
property law, exclusivity rewards have been tied
to the innovative product itself. A copyright is
awarded but only on the book authored. A patent
prohibits infringing use by others for twenty
years but only on the innovative product that
was the subject of the patent. Never before in
US intellectual property law has exclusivity pro-
tection been applied to an existing product be-
cause of an entirely unrelated innovation.
This historic step should give pause, for good
reason. While empirical literature increasingly
challenges the efficiency of the patent system
outside of drugs and chemicals,34 the iron-clad
link between innovation and reward is a key part
of the safety net protecting consumer welfare.
Many promising inventions never pan out in
practice, but if so, then the patent period was
not a drag on the economy because few people
bought the product. But antibiotic vouchers
grant exclusivity to oneproduct (such as a cancer
drug) based on the registration of an entirely
different innovative product (an antibiotic).
Normally, the market for the innovation deter-
mines the value of the patent; here, an entirely
different product determines the value. Vouch-
ers replace the market function of patent valua-
tion with a system designed by Congress.
Partly because of the above concerns, antibiot-
ic vouchersmay face constitutional challenges in
theUnitedStates, since thePatent andCopyright
Clause links the innovation and the reward.
While the US Supreme Court has shown signifi-
cant deference to congressional decisions to ex-
tend intellectual property protections,35 in this
case, the extension would be on an entirely dif-
ferent product. Alternatively, the voucher pro-
posal might be grounded in the Commerce
Clause,36 but the US Supreme Court has not yet
ruled whether a law prohibited under the Patent
and Copyright Clause could be enacted under
other provisions of the Constitution, especially
given the recent moves by the Court to limit the
congressional power in the Affordable Care Act
litigation. Some Justices may find it difficult to
support an innovation incentive that would have
been anathema to the FoundingFathers. Generic
drug companies might also pursue a claim that
thegovernmenthas takenproperty andmustpay
just compensation under the Fifth Amendment,
arguing that their investment-based expecta-
tions were disrupted by the sudden application
of transferable market exclusivity.37 This issue
may be partially addressed by requiring four
years of prior notice before vouchers could be
activated to enable companies developing gener-
ic drugs to plan adequately for generic entry. But
advance notice of a taking generally does not
resolve the claim, which might require compen-
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sation to the companies developing generic
drugs for their losses.
Redesigning Antibiotic Vouchers
Antibiotic vouchers arenot a de novopolicy idea;
rather, they represent a second-generationmod-
ification to earlier wildcard patent extension
proposals.13,15–18 Given the significant remaining
limitationsdetailed above,wenowdescribewhat
design elements third-generation proposals
should feature.
Our primary goal was to make the mechanism
more efficient. Two core insights drove the rede-
sign effort: First, extending regulatory exclusiv-
ities was best understood as a financing mecha-
nism for antibiotic innovation; second, most of
the inefficiencies arose from the gaps between
the efforts required to obtain a voucher and the
value of the voucher in the hands of the transfer-
ee. To put this another way, the core inefficien-
cies resulted from the lack of a link between the
value of the innovation and the value of the
voucher. We offer two alternatives: first, an in-
cremental tailoring of the voucher concept; and
second, a more fundamental shift, with public
auctions of vouchers to fund antibiotic prizes.
Both recognize the financing aspect of vouchers
front and center, while restoring proportionality
between the value of the voucher and the under-
lying innovation. The results look somewhat
more like a prize than a patent.
Tailored Vouchers The first alternative is to
tailor the vouchers to the social value of the anti-
biotic innovation. The two essential features are
described below.
▸ VARY VOUCHER REWARD BY SOCIAL VALUE
OF ANTIBIOTIC INNOVATION: Not all antibiotics
are equally valuable. Another skin and skin-
structure drug for Gram-positive bacteria is a
lower priority and should not receive any vouch-
er-based reward.24 There has to be an agreed set
of antibiotic priorities that cover themost crucial
unmet human needs but that are not so broad
that the system pays for products of limited in-
cremental value. TheCenters forDisease Control
and Prevention has published a list of the most
urgent bacterial threats to the US population.1
New antibiotics targeting these urgent threats,
then, should receive vouchers with significant
market value. Researchers have outlined mech-
anisms for directing greater rewards to the most
significant antibiotic innovations, based on tar-
get product profiles.3,10,24,29,38 A key question is
how to make the market value of the vouchers
more proportional to the value of the antibiotic
innovation. This is addressed in the second es-
sential feature described below.
▸ DESIGN VOUCHER REWARD BASED ON REV-
ENUES AS WELL AS TIME: A voucher period of
twelve months, standing alone, is a blunt instru-
ment. The tie between innovation and reward
would be much tighter if the voucher capped
the revenues that could be protected within
the twelve-month time period. So, for example,
the voucher would expire at the earlier of twelve
months or $1 billion in protected revenues,
whichever occurred first. This provides a clear
cap of the costs (protected revenues) of the
voucher, giving policy makers a much more pre-
cise understanding of the costs associated with
each voucher. Efficiency could be calculated by
comparing this with the antibiotic research and
development cost incurred to procure the vouch-
er through public reporting of this data.
These two features should be combined, vary-
ing the dollar cap by the social value of the new
antibiotic. These values would be set in advance
for a specific target based on health needs. For
example, a novel oral antibiotic for drug-resis-
tantgonorrheamightbeawardedavouchergood
for up to $1.5 billion in protected revenues,while
an entirely novel class of drugs active against
Gram-negative bacteria such as carbapenem-
resistant Enterobacteriaceae—a family of germs
difficult to treat because of high levels of resis-
tance to antibiotics—might receive a voucher for
as much as $3 billion.24
Capping revenues takes pressure off the deci-
sion about the length of voucher exclusivity and
opens the market for purchasing vouchers to
additional buyers, as the market is no longer
limited to thebest-sellingdrugs.Dozensof drugs
have US annual sales exceeding $1 billion.
The rules must articulate clear criteria for any
particular voucher, and prospective changes to
the voucher should occur only to give investors
certainty. Since antibiotics are increasingly ap-
proved based on limited clinical data, vouchers
should also not be awarded immediately upon
FDA approval of the drug but at a later point
when safety and effectiveness can be confidently
and meaningfully assessed—in practical terms,
no sooner than about two to three years after a
drug reaches the market.3,24
In all cases, companies developing generic
drugs will need to have a clear idea of the latest
point at which generic entry might occur. Addi-
tional protections might need to be explored to
secure eventual generic entry. For example, if
vouchers awarded because of the new antibiotics
protect only $1 billion in sales of a drug benefit-
ing from the delayed entry of a competing gener-
ic, then these sales figures would need to be
publicly reported in real time to allow timely
generic entry. The question will also arise as to
whether or not multiple vouchers could be acti-
vated on a single product.
Prescription Drug Policy
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Auctioned Vouchers The second alternative
is amore fundamental reworking of the concept,
with the vouchers no longer awarded for bring-
ing a novel high-quality antibiotic to market.
Instead, the government would directly auction
several twelve-month $1 billion vouchers each
year, putting the proceeds into an antibiotic in-
novation fund. The fund would be used to sup-
port antibiotic access, conservation, and innova-
tion, including significant cash payments for
hitting research and development milestones,18
akin to the current practice at the US govern-
ment’s Biomedical Advanced Research and De-
velopment Authority but including significant
payments after registration.24 For example, if
the government needed to raise $1.8 billion in
cash for the fund, it would sell perhaps $2 billion
in vouchers at public auction. The net proceeds
would then be used to reward antibiotic innova-
tion and support antibiotic stewardship. Auc-
tions would be a highly efficient financingmech-
anism, with clear gains in accountability as well.
If the antibiotic innovation fund was large
enough, full or partial antibiotic delinkage
mechanisms could result.10,29 Rewarding compa-
nies for selling large volumes of antibiotics is
inherently problematic because of drug resis-
tance, leading the industry to recently call for
prizes or value-based delinked reimbursement
for antibiotics at the World Economic Forum
in Davos, Switzerland.39 Value-based delinkage
is when companies are paid based on value or
milestone not sales volume. Delinkage allows
antibiotics to be held in reserve and used entirely
on medical grounds, without commercial exi-
gencies.3 Delinkage simultaneously addresses
problems with access, conservation, and
innovation—a major advance over current
policies.10,24,29,38,39
Challenges For many governments with na-
tional social insurance systems, all voucher pro-
posals discussed herein might look like non-
sense: If all of the funds eventually come from
the health budget, it would be more efficient to
pay for antibiotic innovation directly. As a result,
one challenge, or limitation, of a voucher system
is the difficulty coordinating any US action with
other countries thatmay choose a different path,
including complexities relating to global agree-
ments on intellectual property and trade.33,40
But if antibiotic vouchers are understood pri-
marily as a national financing mechanism, then
it is possible for countries with significant pri-
vate health care financing such as the United
States to adopt tailored or auctioned vouchers
to fund their share of antibiotic stewardship
and innovation, while other countries might use
general revenues or health budgets directly.33,40
Indeed, this could operate in the United States
solely as anational systembutwith theprograms
linked to wider international action.
Finally, while these proposals do not make
potential constitutional issues worse, those
questions still remain unanswered.
Conclusion
Policy makers should be aware of the inequities
and inefficiencies associated with antibiotic
voucher proposals. If vouchers are to be used,
they must be more carefully tailored by focusing
only on the highest-quality innovation and cap-
ping protected revenues over specified time pe-
riods. Evenmoredirectly, vouchers could be auc-
tioned to the highest bidders, and the funds then
used to promote antibiotic access, conservation,
and innovation.Either alternative is a significant
improvement over current proposals. ▪
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